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In a dynamic noncooperative two-level hierarchical situation with a single decision 
1ker on the upper level (a 'coordinator'), the decision makers on the lower level 
layers') may attempt to achieve an advantage through the effect that their actions have 
the position of the coordinator. We introduce a model for such 'strategic behavior' 
1t allow us to study the way in which this behavior depends on the choice of a decision 
e by the coordinator. The model requires the analysis of an infinite-horizon nonlinear 
ferential game with a one-dimensional state space. © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All 
hts reserved. 
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Introduction 
The noncooperative one-leader/several-followers model is relevant for a great 
1mber of social and economic situations, in which a coordinating agent or 
ntral board is dealing with a number of agents at a lower level who have some 
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independent decision power. One interesting aspect of this situation, when 
considered in a dynamic setting, is that the responsiveness of the leader to the 
follower's actions may be exploited by the followers for their own purposes. This 
is what is sometimes called strategic behavior. It is the purpose of this paper to 
build and analyze a class of models in which such strategic behavior in a non-
cooperative hierarchical control setting can be studied. It would be too much to 
expect analytical solutions in this context, even for the relatively simple models 
that we shall consider, but we shall demonstrate the numerical tractability of the 
models in the class that we shall describe. 
One-leader/several-followers situations occur very frequently in various types 
of organizations and socio-economic structures, with varying types of division of 
power between the decision levels. For instance, supranational organizations 
usually have a central board, which however often serves as a negotiation 
platform for the member states rather than as a decision unit with independent 
power. In the case of the European Union, however, it is probably reasonable to 
say that the European Commission takes to some extent its own decisions. On 
the national level, the one-leader/several-followers model may for instance be 
used in a description of the relation between the national government (as leader) 
and the trade unions and employers (as followers). Here it is clear that each of 
the involved parties determines its own strategy, with the government in a medi-
ating role whereas the unions and the employers are likely to follow Nash-type 
strategies with respect to each other. More strictly hierarchical situations can be 
found for instance in large companies with several business units, but even here 
one may argue that the business units have their own goals which they will 
pursue. In other realms of life, one may think of the relation between a referee 
and the two teams in a sports game; the teams are in some sense subordinate to 
the referee but are also free to choose the actions they see best fit to achieve 
victory, whereas the referee does not have such a clear criterion to optimize but 
does aim for a certain type of stability. In each of the examples given above, the 
decision makers on the lower level are knowledgeable about the way the leader 
will respond to their actions, and they will incorporate this knowledge into their 
decisions. They may even try to 'invest' in a change of attitude of the leader in 
order to gain in the long run. We shall refer to this type of behavior as strate[.Jic 
behavior. 
Situations in which one has one leader and several followers are also studied 
in hierarchical control theory. In the large body of literature devoted to hier-
archical control (see for instance Mesarovic et al. 1970; J amshidi 1983; Singh 
1980), it is typically assumed, however, that the agents at the lower level will 
simply follow the instructions coming from the upper level. The cooperativity 
assumption is perfectly valid in many technical systems, but is subject to 
a Lucas-type critique in the context of social and economic systems. Indeed, the 
ke.y p~int in the Lucas (1976) critique of traditional econometric policy evalu-
at10n ts that the agents in the economy have their own purposes and will plan 
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their actions using their knowledge of the expected government's responses. 
Strategic behavior in the sense used here may be seen as a manifestation of this 
fact in a deterministic noncooperative hierarchical control setting. 
The one-leader/several-followers model is presented in the context of finite 
games for instance by Ba~ar and Olsder (1995), (Definition 3.35); a study of 
strategic behavior in our sense however requires a dynamic setting. Such 
a context is used by Bagchi (1984), (Chapter 5) in a model for a regional 
investment allocation problem, but he uses an open-loop equilibrium concept 
which again precludes a study of strategic behavior. Also the 'incentives' model 
as presented by Ho et al. (1982) does not seem capable of representing strategic 
behavior, since in this model the objective functions of the followers can be 
directly altered by the leader. In general the one-leader/several-followers model 
does not seem to have been used very much in the literature; this may be due to 
the inherent complexity of the model, which virtually rules out any analytic 
solutions. In this paper we shall present a numerical solution method, under the 
admittedly restrictive (but in some circumstances still justifiable) assumption of 
a one-dimensional state. 
In summary, we shall consider a type of problem that from a control theory 
point of view can be looked at as noncooperative hierarchical control problems, 
or from a game theory point of view as dynamic games with one leader and 
several noncooperative followers. To emphasize the nature of the situation, we 
shall refer to the leader as the 'coordinator' and to the followers as 'players'. We 
shall work within an infinite-horizon continuous-time setting, and take the 
stationary feedback Nash equilibrium as a solution concept on the lower level, 
whereas the strategy of the coordinator will be taken from some parametrized 
class of strategies. The players are aware of the strategy used by the coordinator, 
and they will use this knowledge when choosing their own strategies; this is the 
'strategic behavior'. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we will develop a general 
model describing the strategic interactions between players and coordinator. In 
Section 3 we will discuss solution methods for differential-algebraic equations in 
general and for HJBI equations in particular. Then in Sections 4 and 5 we 
present two mechanisms fitting the general model of Section 2. In Section 4 we 
present a redistribution mechanism in which the coordinator is given direct 
control over the distribution of the payoffs between the individual players. We 
will discuss how one can numerically obtain all stationary feedback Nash 
equilibria of the resulting differential game using the methods developed in 
Section 3, and illustrate this by a worked example. In Section 5 we present 
another possible mechanism fitting the general model, which we refer to as the 
Pareto mechanism. In this case the coordinator influences the choice of Pareto 
efficient strategy, in such a way that the resulting differential game describes 
a movement along the Pareto frontier of the underlying static game. Finally, in 
Section 6 we present some conclusions. 
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2. General model formulation 
2.1. Introduction 
Consider the following situation. Two players repeatedly play a nonzero-sum 
game G. Assume now that the game G depends in some way (through the payoffs 
that the players receive, or through the strategy spaces that are available to 
them) on a parameter :x E [O, 1] that may vary in time. The value of e>: is 
determined by a 'coordinator' through some decision rule that takes the actions 
of the players into account. In this way the decisions of the players can influence 
their future payoffs, and a differential game arises which we shall refer to as the 
'controlled game'. Working over an infinite horizon and comparing the asymp-
totic values of the equilibria of the controlled game to the possible modes of play 
in the original game G. we can see to what extent the decision rule meets the 
coordinator's objectives. 
Example 1. Consider two identical firms producing the same good. The firms 
realize that it is not efficient to determine the amounts to produce separately. 
They also know that a kartel-like cooperative like OPEC, in which they both 
would have to agree on the exact amounts to produce at the given time instant, 
is not stable, in the sense that there is always an incentive to deviate. So they 
decide to establish a cooperative in which they both sign an agreement that this 
cooperative sells the goods on the markets and then shares the payoffs between 
the firms. The cooperative gives advice to the firms on the amounts to produce. 
Based on this advice and on the actual amounts produced, the cooperative 
determines (according to a certain rule that is known to the firms) which share of 
the profit goes to each firm. Assuming that the cooperative is a price-taker and 
that the market clears instantaneously, the game G that is played at every time 
instant is a Cournot duopoly. The parameter a E [O, l] is the ratio of the profit 
that goes to firm 1. The decision rule for the coordinator now involves the choice 
of :x(t) based on the amount of goods produced by both firms at time instant t. 
Global control objectives may be stated for instance in terms of 'fairness' or 
'efficiency'. 
We formalize this idea as follows. Consider a two-player static game 
G in strategic form, with strategy spaces I'; and payoff functions rci. In this 
game the objective for player i is to maximize his payoff re;. From this game 
G we construct a new game, G(ix), for every e>: in [O, l ], where :x is the variable 
that is manipulated by the coordinator. Denote by I';(et.) the strategy spaces 
of G(ix) and for each ixE[0,1] by v;:I' 1(:x)xI'2(a)->IR the payoffs of G(CL). 
Now assume that the coordinator can discriminate between the strategies 
)';(:>:) chosen by the individual players, and uses a decision rule f to deter-
mine the future values of ix based on the observed decisions (y 1(a), y2 (cx.)), 
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such that 
ri. =f(a, Yi(a), Y2(a)). 
Finally, by choosing as an objective function for the individual players either 
ff'; = J>; (a(t), }' 1 (a(t)), y2(a(t))) dt 
or 
f!'i = t' e-'1v;(a(t), ')' 1(o:(t)), y2(a(t)))dt 
for some r > 0, a differential game is specified, which we refer to as the 
controlled game. So the construction of a controlled game from a static game 
G is done in the following steps: 
Step 1: choice of a coordination mechanism G >--+ G(a), 
Step 2: specification of a decision rule .f(o:, y i. 1• 2 ) for the coordinator, 
Step 3: choice between a finite-horizon criterion and an infinite-horizon 
discounted criterion, and in the latter case specification of r > 0. 
2.2. Construction of a controlled game 
The construction of a controlled game as just described can be carried out in 
many ways. In this subsection we shall make some more specific choices, which 
however will still leave open quite a wide range of possibilities. First we make 
some assumptions on the underlying static game G. Note that these assumptions 
are made for convenience only; by making these assumptions we can reduce the 
involved technicalities so that we can focus on fundamental issues. 
Assumption 2. The strategy spaces I'; ~ IRk are convex. 
The payoff functions n;: I' 1 x f 2 -* IR, i = 1, 2, are twice differentiable and 
strictly concave, i.e. 
rPn- ) 
ay .. 1 (_1;2 < o. 
D2n; 
Dyf 
By 1' = CVi. Y2) Er 1xr2 we denote a Nash equilibrium of the game G. 
For convenience, we assume that the strategy spaces I';(a) of G(a) are con-
structed as: 
}';(tx) := l°Jo:)yf{o:) + (1 - C;(ct)) }'f(a). (1) 
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In doing this, we effectively parametrize the players' decisions for a given IX in 
terms of a variable c;(a) that takes values between 0 and 1 and that can in some 
applications be interpreted as 'willingness to cooperate'. Denote by y1(1X) a strat-
egy that player i is advised to play in the event the coordinator chooses IX. 
Furthermore, denote by yf(a) an alternative strategy, that player i would play 
when playing noncooperatively, i.e. the strategy player i chooses in case he 
ignores the advice of the coordinator. The issue on how to choose such an 
alternative strategy is closely related to the issue of choosing threatpoints or 
disagreement strategies in bargaining theory (see, e.g. van Damme, 1991; Houba, 
1994; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1991). A possible choice of alternative strategy is 
a Nash equilibrium for the underlying game G. Especially in the case that G has 
a unique Nash equilibrium this seems to be a good choice, for the Nash 
equilibrium is the standard equilibrium concept in noncooperative situations 
(see, e.g. van Damme, 1991). Another choice might be a best reply against the 
strategy yj(a) of the other player. 
Intuitively, c;(a) is a parameter reflecting the willingness of player i to follow 
the advice of the coordinator for given IX. If c;(a) = 0 then player i chooses to play 
the alternative strategy yf(a) and if c;(IX) = 1 then player i chooses to play the 
strategy y1(a). We allow the players to hesitate between cooperative and non-
cooperative play by allowing the parameter c;(a) to take values between 0 and 1. 
Hence, for given C;(a), the strategy that is actually played by player i is given by 
Eq. (1). 
As before, we assume that the coordinator by observing the actions of both 
players at time-instant t knows the value of c;(a(t)). Using this information the 
coordinator adjusts the value of a(t). The process of coordination can be 
described by a decision rule f, resulting in the dynamics 
d(t) = f(a(t), y1(a(t)), y2(a(t))), (2) 
which, by some abuse of notation we will sometimes write as 
d(t) = f(a(t), c1(a(t)), c2(a(t))), (3) 
thus emphasizing the fact that the choice of (c 1(a), c2(a)) fully determines the pair 
of strategies (;11(a), Y2(a)). 
The decision rule f has to satisfy some properties: 
1. fhas to be sufficiently smooth, i.e. fhas to be at least twice differentiable w.r.t. 
c;, and at least differentiable w.r.t. IX, 
2. Vc,,c}(O,ci,Cz) ~ 0, f(l,ci,c 2) :s; 0, 
3. a2fjac;aci = o, afjac; ¥- o. 
The smoothness condition is imposed in order to prevent some technical 
difficulties in the sequel of this paper. Clearly this condition might be weakened 
at the expense of some technical difficulties. The second condition is crucial, in 
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the sense that it guarantees that o:(t) remains in [O, 1] for all t. Note that, due to 
this property, every nontrivial choice for f will be nonlinear. Finally, the third 
condition is sufficient to guarantee that the optimization problems we will 
encounter in the sequel of this paper are strictly concave, and that the mecha-
nism is not trivial. Obviously also this condition might be weakened, and in this 
case a more delicate analysis would be required. An example of a coordination 
rule satisfying properties 1--3 is 
where (5 is a nonzero constant. 
As already remarked in the introduction, an important assumption we make 
is that both players exactly know the decision rule f the coordinator is using. 
This opens a possibility for strategic behavior by both players. By choosing 
c 1 and c2 the players can influence the behavior of the coordinator. A nonlinear 
differential game emerges, where rx is the state variable, c 1 and c2 are the 
controls, and with the payoff functionals 
Li= f v;(o:(t), y1(o:(t)), /12(a(t)))dt, (4) 
in which y;(a(t)) = do:(t))y{(a(t)) + (1 - c;(o:(t)))1•f(o:{t)). This newly defined differ-
ential game is the controlled game. 
Note that by introducing y;(a) = cj(a)·l'{(o:) + (1 - ci(o:))·yt(a) the payoff for 
player i at time instant t is given by v;(o:(t), y1(a(t)), y2(a(t))), which we will 
sometimes write with some abuse of notation as vi(a(t),c 1(t),c 2(t)). In the sequel 
of this paper we will assume that v1 and v2 are strictly concave in (c 1,c 2). Note 
again that this concavity assumption is for convenience only; dropping this 
assumption will only result in a technically more involved analysis. 
2.3. Equilibria of the controlled game 
A natural solution concept to consider for the controlled game is the feedback 
Nash equilibrium (see Ba~ar and Olsder, 1995). As is well-known (see Ba~ar and 
Olsder, 1995), feedback Nash equilibria for this differential game correspond to 
solutions of the Hamilton--Jacobi Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equations 
(5) 
(6) 
where V 1 and V 2 denote value functions. 
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Remark 3. We use Eqs. (5) and (6) as a shorthand notation for 
av 1 av 1 . ) ( )) ( • ( l ( )) 
- - 0 - (a, t) = - (ex, t ).f (ex, c 1 (ex, t , c 2 ex, t + v 1 ex, l 1 a, t , c 2 IX, t , 
et ocx 
(7) 
_ c1V 2 (cx,t) = c1V2(cx,t)f(cx,c 1(cx,t),Cz(CX,t)) + V2(!Y.,C1(a,t),cz{!Y.,t)) 
at acx 
(8) 
in which 
(9) 
{av, } c2(cx,t)Eargmax --;;-=-(cx,t)f(cx,c 1(cx,t),c 2 ) + V2(a,c1(1X,t),c2) . 
c2e[O, 1] 01'.X 
(10) 
The same shorthand notation will be used in similar cases below. 
In order to facilitate our analysis, we will consider the controlled game over 
an infinite time horizon, with discounted payoffs. This produces the payoff 
functionals 
Li = fo'00 e -"v;(u(t), y1 (a(t)), y2(ix(t))) dt, (11) 
where /';(cx(t)) = c;(ix(t)))it(cx(t)) + (1 - c;(cx(t)))yf(a(t)). Moreover we shall restrict 
our attention to stationary feedback Nash equilibria2 corresponding to continu-
ously differentiable value functions. 
Now the HJBI equations describing stationary feedback Nash equilibria (see, 
e.g. Feichtinger and Wirl, 1993; Tsutsui and Mino, 1990) reduce to the system 
rV1(1X) = max {V11(ix)f(1X,l'i,C2) + V1(1X,C[,C2)}, (12) 
C1E[O, 1) 
rV2(ix) = max {V~(!Y.)f(IX,Ci,C2) + V2(!Y.,Ci,C2)}, (13) 
c,e[O, 1] 
where of course also remark 3 applies. 
Remark 4. The characterization of stationary feedback Nash equilibria by the 
HJBI Eqs. (12) and (13) must be understood in the following way. It can be 
shown that if (J.'i, V 2, c1,C2) are continuously differentiable solutions of Eqs. (12) 
2 In Feichtinger and Wirl, (1993), Maskin and Tirole (1994), Tsutsui and Mino, (1990), these are 
called Markov perfect Nash equilibria. 
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and (13) such that V 1 and V 2 are bounded, then the pair of strategies (ci. c2 ) is 
a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium (see also Tsutsui and Mino, 1990). 
Remark 5. Note that by requiring stationary feedback Nash equilibria, Folk-
theorem-like results do not immediately apply, for trigger strategies are not 
admissible (see Maskin and Tirole (1994)). Nevertheless, stationary feedback 
Nash equilibria are in general not unique (see Feichtinger and Wirl, 1993; 
Tsutsui and Mino, 1990; W eeren et al., 1994 ). 
By the assumption that v1 and v2 are strictly concave in c1 and c2 and by the 
assumptions on.f; system (12), (13) is equivalent to the system 
f(o:,ci,c 2 )V'1(a) + v1(a,c 1 ,c2)- rV 1(a) = 0, 
f(a,ci,c2JV2(a) + v2(ct,c1,c2) - rV 2(o:) = 0, 
0 S C I S 1, ( l - C i)I) I S 0, C 11) I 2:: 0, 
0 S Cz S 1, (1 - Cz)IJ2 S 0, C21J2 2:: 0. 
(14) 
(15) 
( 16) 
( 17) 
In case no constraint on c 1 and c2 is active, this results in the system of 
differential-algebraic equations 
f(a,c 1,c2 )V'1(0:) + v1(a,ci,c 2 ) - rV 1(a) = 0, 
f(rx,c 1,c2)V'z(a) + v2(a,c,,c·2) - rV2(rx) = 0. 
( 18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
The equations above constitute four differential/algebraic equations in four 
unknowns, to wit V 1(a), V 2 (a), c 1(o:), and c2(rx). Because the equations are DAEs 
rather than ODEs, the number of required initial conditions is not four but 
rather two in most cases, as will be shown below. The equations will in general 
have a unique solution for a given initial condition; the freedom in choosing the 
initial condition corresponds to the non uniqueness of feedback Nash equilibria 
( cf. van Damme, 1991 ). Once a solution is obtained, the functional dependence of 
c 1 and c2 on a is established and the evolution of rx as a function oft can be 
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obtained from Eq. (3), in which c1 and c2 depend on t through a. Subsequently, 
the evolution in time of c1 and c2 is obtained, and in particular one finds the 
limit values of c 1 and c2 as t tends to infinity. It is then of interest, for instance, to 
study the dependence of these limit values on the choice of a Nash equilibrium 
and on the strategy of the coordinator. The process will be illustrated in several 
examples below. 
3. Analysis of HJBI-DAEs 
In the current section we will discuss the (numerical) treatment of the HJBI-
DAEs. For a extensive treatment of general DAEs the interested reader is 
referred to Brasey and Hairer (1993), Brenan et al. (1989), Gear (1988), Griepen-
trog and Marz (1986), Hairer et al. (1989) and Hairer and Wanner (1991). 
By a differential-algebraic equation (DAE) is meant an equation of the form 
F(t,y,y') = 0, (22) 
in which y is a function oft, and y' is the first derivative of y with respect to t. 
First we take a look at the system ofHJBI-DAEs, Eqs. (18)-(21), i.e. the system 
of HJBI equations in case the constraints c1 ~ 0, c1 :::;; 1, c2 ~ 0 and c2 :::;; 1 are 
not active. For ease of notation, we will suppress the arguments off, V;, and v; in 
the rest of this section. Define 
V1 
V2 
y:= (23) 
C1 
C2 
We first compute the Jacobian Fy'• 
of 
0 0 0 
OC1 
of 
0 0 0 
Fy' = OC2 (24) 
f 0 0 0 
0 f 0 0 
Clearly Fy· is not invertible, so the system (18)-(21) is not an (implicit) ODE. 
Differentiating the system of HJBI-DAEs once, using o2f!oc;oci = O and 
Eqs. (18) and (19), we obtain the additional equations 
02f V' + of V" + o2v1 o2 v1 , o2 v1 
:;--0 I - 1 -- + --C1 + ---c' = 0 VIX C1 OC1 oaoc1 od OC1 f) Cz 2 , (25) 
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(26) 
(27) 
j ·v" ((!! )(ov·2I of) ov2 (ov2 <3f' o.v2/ DJ) 2- --r - - +-+ ---- - c' =0 
aa OCz OC2 Ori. OC1 OC1 OC2 OC2 1 . (28) 
Note that we can eliminate V'{ and V~ from Eqs. (27) and (28) using Eqs. (25) 
and (26). Using this elimination we can straightforwardly derive that Eqs. (27) 
and (28) constitute an implicit ODE for c'1 and c~ if and only if the matrix 
(29) 
is nonsingular. The procedure we have followed for the system (18)-(21), can in 
general be applied to any DAE. Related to this procedure the so-called (differen-
tial) index is introduced: the index of a DAE is, loosely speaking, the (minimal) 
number of times the system (22) has to be differentiated in order to obtain 
a (possibly implicit) ODE. For a more formal treatment of the index see, e.g. 
Griepentrog and Marz (1986) and Brenan et al. (1989). The index is of crucial 
importance in selecting a numerical solution method for a given DAE. Back-
ward differentiation formulas (BDF) have emerged as the most popular and best 
understood class of linear multistep methods for DAEs (see Brenan et al., 1989; 
Hairer and Wanner, 1991 ). In general, multistep methods and Runge-Kutta 
methods are not stable for higher-index DAE systems. In the case of a system of 
DAEs of index 0 or 1 it is always possible to use these methods. A well-known 
implementation of the BDF technique is provided in the Fortran package 
DASSL (as described in Brenan et al. ( 1989)). For the treatment of higher-index 
systems the reader is referred to Brasey and Hairer ( 199 3), Bren an et al. ( 1989), 
Gear ( 1988), Hairer et al. ( 1989) and Hairer and Wanner ( 1991 ). 
Remark 6. Note that the method of studying HJBI equations via the so-called 
auxiliary equations as introduced in Tsutsui and Mino, (1990) is closely related 
to the setup described in this section. The model considered in Tsutsui and 
Mino, ( J 990) is of a more special form than the one considered here, which 
makes it possible to obtain explicit expressions for the equilibrium feedback 
strategies and to substitute these in the HJBI equations. Then, by differentiating 
the HJBI equations (implicit) ODEs are obtained. These ODEs have the 
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property that they do not depend on V 1 and V 2· After deriving the OD Es, 
symmetry conditions are used to reduce the system of ODEs to a single 
first-order ODE in y = V'1 = V~. This ODE is then solved analytically. In 
Feichtinger and Wirl, (1993) a similar setup is used. 
Recapitulating we now have the following result for the system (18)-(21). 
Proposition 7. The system of HJBl-DAEs, Eqs. (18)-(21), has index 1 if and only if 
the matrix j given by Eq. (29) is nonsingular. 
The systems of DAEs which emerge when one of the constraints c1 ~ 0, 
c1 ::;; 1, c2 z 0 or c2 ::;; 1 becomes active, can be shown to have index at least one 
in a similar fashion. Moreover, conditions as described in Proposition 7 can be 
derived. 
In case two constraints are active, the equations are either index 0 (i.e. implicit 
OD Es) or algebraic, depending on whether f(rJ., Ci, c2 ) = 0 or not. 
4. A redistribution mechanism 
As already discussed in Section 2, there are several ways in which the coord-
ination parameter ix may affect the underlying static game G. In this section we 
consider the case in which the payoffs depend on rJ., but y* and ya do not. 
Moreover, we will concentrate on the control objective of cooperative behavior. 
This objective can be chosen in order to maximize efficiency. In this section we 
will show how for this control objective a controlled game can be specified and 
analyzed. Special attention is payed to the HJBI-DAEs that arise for this case. 
For a particular choice of game G and decision rule/ we illustrate the numerical 
method. 
4.1. A symmetric redistribution game 
We make the following assumptions about the underlying static game G. 
Assumption 8. (i) The game G is symmetric, i.e. I' 1 = I' 2 and rr 1(y1'y 2) = 
n:i(y2, Y1), 
(ii) G has a unique Nash equilibrium given by (Yi. y2 ), with equilibrium payoffs 
(ifi. if2), 
(iii) the unique Nash equilibrium of G is not Pareto efficient. 
The symmetry suggests restricting our attention to Pareto efficient strategies 
'(1) d" 1 y 2 correspon mg toµ= 2 (see Theorem 13). So for the cooperative strategy we 
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choose 1·r(ix) = f;(-!). The second assumption, that G has a unique Nash equilib-
rium, justifies the choice of this Nash equilibrium as the alternative strategy, i.e. 
l'T(cx) = ji;. Note that both the cooperative strategies )'* and the alternative 
strategies y• do not depend on ex in this case. The extra payoffs from playing 
y;(cx) = C;(cx)y;(-!) + (1 - c;(cx)))'; are given by 
rr*(c1,C2) := n1(Y1(ix), }'2(cx)) + rr2(}'1(ix), Y2(ix)) - n1{Yi, i'2l - rr2(Yi, 1'2). (30) 
Now suppose that these extra payoffs are redistributed over the players by the 
coordinator, according to the rule 
(31) 
(32) 
Then the HJBI equations describing the stationary feedback Nash equilibria of 
the controlled game are given by 
rVi(o:) = max {V'1(o:)f(o:,ci,c2) + o:n*(c1,c2)}, (33) 
c,e[O, l] 
rV2(o:) = max {V2(cx)f(o:,c 11 c2) + (1- o:)n*(c1oc2)}, (34) 
c,e[O, I] 
or, as long as the constraints c1 ~ 0, c1 :s;; 1, c2 ~ 0, c2 :s;; 1 are not active, in the 
form (18)(21): 
uf ' un* 
--VI +Cl-~-·= 0, 
CC I OC 1 
elf ' an* 
--V1 +(I - o:)··-- = 0, uc 2 - Dc 2 
JV'1 +an* - rV 1 = 0, 
fV2 + (1 - cx)rr* - rV 2 = 0. 
As the coordinator's decision rule, we shall take 
f(o:, Ci, c2 ) = /Jcx(l - cx)(c2 - ci), 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
with /1 ;t= O. Now, if we solve Eqs. (35) and (36) for (V'i, V2), and then substitute 
the result in Eqs. (37) and (38), we obtain 
on* 
- /)cx(l - cx)V'1 +ex-,:;-= 0, 
UC 1 
Drr* 
/Jo:(! - o:)V2 +(I - o:)-~- = 0, 
OCz 
(39) 
(40) 
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on* 
rx(c? - c1)- + rxn* - rV 1 =0, 
- . OC1 
c7n* 
-(1 -rx)(c2 - ci)-- + (1- rx)n* - rV 2 = 0. oc2 
The matrix cl (see Eq. (29)) is given by 
(41) 
(42) 
Note that cl is nonsingularfor all rxE(O, 1) if and only ifthe matrix J given by 
is nonsingular. Before we show that the system of HJBI-DAEs, Eqs. (39H42), is 
an index 1 system, we first need the following lemma: 
Lemma 9. The function n* defined in Eq. (30) is strictly concave, i.e. the matrix 
(
1J2n* 
ad 
o2 n* 
OC10C2 
is neyative definite. 
Proof The symmetry of the game G implies y 1 = }'2 = : -~ and f 1 (!) = 1'z(t} =: Y. 
Then elementary calculus shows that 
( a'n' a'n') r D'n, ) ( D'n, a2n2 --· < n1 ad oc 1oc2 ~Jyf a,;,a,; + a,r 0}'1UY2 = ('9 - y)2 
a2n2 o2n* u2n* 02n1 D2n1 Zi 2n2 
OC10C2 od Dy 1 oyz D·;~ ny 1<1y2 ay~ 
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from the strict concavity of rr 1 and rr 2 it follows that 
for i = 1,2, and hence 
( 
02 rr* 
aci 
a2n* 
llc 1 Dc 2 
since f =fa y by Assumption 8(iii). D 
Proposition 10. The system of HJ BI-DAEs, Eqs. (39H42), has index on its 
domain of validity (0, 1) x (0, 1). 
PrDI~( We will show that the matrix J appearing in Eq. (43) is nonsingular for 
all ()(e(O, 1). We will consider two cases, first the case c1 =fa cz, and secondly the 
case c 1 = c2 . In the case c1 =fa c2 we note that J is the sum of a skew-symmetric 
matrix and a matrix that is, depending on the sign of c 2 - c1' either positive or 
negative definite. It follows that the quadratic form determined by J is sign 
definite, and in particular this implies that, for c 1 =fa c2, J is nonsingular. In the 
case c 1 = c2 , we see that 
0 
}= 
( c!rr* orr*) 
- -oc 1 + c3c2 
Note that rr*(c 1,c2 ) = n*(c2,c1), and hence J is singular if and only if 
crr*/3c 1 = Drr*/oc2 = 0. Elementary calculus shows that orr*/<1c 1 = Drr*/cc 2 = 0 
if and only if 
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Note that these last equations are (see Theorem 13) precisely the first-order 
conditions characterizing f(-!-), and hence satisfied if and only if c 1 = c 2 = l. 
However, c 1 = c2 = 1 lies outside the domain of validity (0, 1) x (0, 1). 0 
Because the system of HJBI-DAEs, Eqs. (39)-(42), has index 1, we can derive 
ODEs for c1 and c2 by differentiating Eqs. (39)-(42) once. The resulting ODEs 
are given by 
( r )on* * 
- (cz - C1) - /3(1 - IX) ac; + n CD=,,_1 
( r ) on* (cz - ci) - {Ja 3c2 + n* 
(44) 
We shall be interested in particular in symmetric solutions, i.e. those for which 
c1 (ix) = c2(1 - ix) and V i(a) = V 2(1 - ix). These solutions can be characterized as 
follows. 
Lemma 11. A solution (V 1, V2,c1,c2) of the HJBl-DAEs, Eqs. (39)-{42), is sym-
metric if and only if it satisfies c1(!) = c 2(!). 
Proof By writing the HJBI-DAEs, Eqs. (39)-(42), and its first derivatives, evalu-
ated in ix = i, it is easily verified that there are only 2 degrees of freedom in 
specifying consistent initial3 conditions, i.e. when 2 variables out of 
{V 1(!}, V 2(i), C 1 {!), C2(i), V'1 (!), V'i(-!), C11 (!),c~(!)} 
are chosen, the other variables are fixed by the system of HJBI-DAEs, 
Eqs. (39)-(42), and its first derivatives, evaluated in ix = I /2. 
Now let (V 1(a), Vz(cx),c 1(ix),c2 (ix)) be a solution of the HJBI-DAEs. 
Eqs. (39)-(42), corresponding to the initial conditions (c 1 (!), c2(i)). Then it can 
straightforwardly be shown that (V 2(1 - a), V1(1 - a),c 2 (1 - ix),c 1(l - ex)) is 
a solution of the HJBI-DAEs, Eqs. (39)-(42), corresponding to the initial corn.ii-
tions (c2(!), c1(!)). From Eq. (44) we see, because 
( r ) Dn* - (c2 - ci) - ----- ---- + n* /J(l - IX) ac 1 
3 Note that in this case we consider ex= 1/2 as the 'starting point', i.e. initial conditions are 
specified in a = I /2. 
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is a C 1 function and hence satisfies a Lipschitz condition, that whenever 
c1(i) = Cz(i), necessarily c 1(ix) = c2(1 - ix) for all ixE(O, 1). 0 
4.2. A worked example 
In this subsection we will construct a redistribution controlled game describ-
ing a situation as sketched in Example 1. Hence we choose for G a Cournot 
duopoly. To be specific, let us assume that the price equation is 
{ 120 - y p(y) = 0 
if y ::::; 120, 
if y > 120 
and that the production costs of the individual firms are given by 
Ci(y;) = yf_ 
(45) 
(46) 
Then the payoffs of G are given by (see, e.g. Gibbons 1992; Takayama 1985): 
(47) 
and consequently the Nash equilibrium 1' of G, with payoff ii, and the Pareto 
efficient strategy y(i), with payoff ft, are given by 
ii= 24, 
ii = 1152, 
y(il = 20, 
fr= 1200. 
Hence, the additional payoffs after redistribution (30) are 
n*(c1,C2) = 96(c1 + Cz) - 32(cf + C1C2 + d). 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
(52) 
Remark 12. The controlled game that is constructed in this way can be inter-
preted as follows. Consider two firms who produce an identical product. Instead 
of selling the products themselves, the goods are sold on an instantaneously 
clearing market by a separate institution (the coordinator), who distributes the 
payoffs between the two firms using the decision rule f (see Example 1). 
From Eqs. (39)-(42) we find the HJBI-DAEs 
, 96 - 64c 1 - 32c2 
V1 = /J(l _ ~-) -, (53) 
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,, - 96 + 32c 1 + 64c2 
v' = ' 
- {Ja (54) 
(55) 
(56) 
Similar HJBI-DAEs can be derived for the cases where one or more constraints 
on ci become active. 
By starting the integration at ix = i and using symmetry, the systems of 
HJBI-DAEs are solved using DASSL (see Brenan et al. 1989). In fact, we only 
calculate V 1' V 2, c1 and c2 for a from a = i to a = 0.999, (thus avoiding the 
singularity at rx = 1), and then by using symmetry (i.e. c 1(a) = c2(1 - o:)) we 
obtain the results for a = 0.001 to ex = 0.999. The DASSL output is then fed 
into Matlab, where we use spline interpolation and the built-in Runge-Kutta 
ODE solver to simulate the resulting closed-loop dynamics of the controlled 
game. 
We have already seen in the proof of Lemma 11 that in specifying consistent 
initial conditions the degree of freedom is 2, i.e. when one of the pairs of variables 
(V 1(-i), V 2(~)) or equivalently (c 1 (i), c2(i)) is chosen, the others are fixed by the 
system of HJBI-DAEs. By requiring the extra symmetry condition 
c1(a) = c2(1 - a), V 1(1X) = V 2(1 - a), i.e. c1(i) = c2(i), the degree of freedom is 
reduced to 1. In the experiments we have started by fixing the initial value of 
c 1 (~) = c2(!), which then fully determines the consistent initial conditions. 
In the experiments we have fixed the parameters {'J = J and r = l. Note that by 
choosing (J > 0 the rule f is such that the coordinator exhibits a kind of alluring 
behavior. If one of the players deviates more than the other, the coordinator will 
try to convince this player to cooperate more by offering him a new a which is 
more favorable to him. 
We have varied the initial conditions c1(!) = c 2 C~) (see Table I). Consistent 
values V 1(1) = V 2(1) are then calculated using the HJBI-DAEs Eqs. (53)-(56), 
evaluated in a = !, 
The results of the experiments are shown in Figs. 1 6. In Figs. l and 2 we see 
that for the initial conditions corresponding to ci(i) = c2(i) = 0.75 and 
c1dl = c2(-!) = 0.79, the solutions V 1 and V 2 become unbounded, and hence do 
not correspond to a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of the controlled 
game.4 In the other cases (see Figs. 3-6), V 1 and V 2 are continuously differenti-
able and bounded, and hence correspond to stationary feedback Nash equilibria 
"Note that rr* is bounded and so the same holds for cm* and (1 - ot)rr*. Using the fact that the 
discount factor r is positive, it immediately follows that any value function is necessarily bounded. 
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Table 1 
Some consistent initial conditions for f3 = 1/3, r = I 
c,(}) = c2(:\) Vi(1) = V2d) 
0.75 45 
0.79 45.8832 
0.796 46.002432 
0.8 46.08 
0.9 47.52 
0.99 47.9952 
V1(alpha) 
2000 
1500 
1000 
500 
0 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
alpha 
Optimal c 
0.5 
0 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
alpha 
for the controlled game. In the Figs. 3 6 we have plotted V 1 (a), c1 (IX), the 
closed-loop mechanismf(a, c1(0l), c2(0l)) and the simulated closed-loop dynamics 
&(t) =f(Ol(t),c 1(1X(t)),c2(0l(t))) for Ol(O) = 0.35,0.4,0.45,0.5,0.55,0.6 and 0.65. 
In Figs. 3 and 4 we see that the corresponding stationary feedback Nash 
equilibria support five different steady states; three of these are unstable (IX= 0, 
()( = 0.5 and IX = 1), and two are stable (IX~ 0.4 and()( ~ 0.6). Finally, in Figs. 5 and 
6, the stationary feedback Nash equilibria support only three steady states; two of 
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alpha 
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alpha 
Fig. 2. c1(!) = c2(l) = 0.79. 
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alpha 
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alpha 
Closed Loop Mechanism 
0.04 
0.02 
0 
-0.02 
-0.040 
05 
alpha 
Closed loop dynamics 
0.7 
"' 
-a 0.5 
"ffi 
0.30 5 10 15 
Fig. 4. C1(1) = C2(:\) = 0.8. 
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Fig. 5. C1(!) = l'2(!l = 0.9. 
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Fig. 6. c 1 ("~) = c 2(~) = 0.99. 
these are unstable (:x = 0 and a= 1) and one is stable (:x = 0.5). This suggests 
that somewhere between c1(t) = c2(t) = 0.9 and c1(!) = c2(l) = 0.8 a bifurcation 
takes place. To confirm this, we calculated the steady states belonging 
to equilibria corresponding to initial conditions c 1(t) = c2 (1) ranging from 0.8 to 
0.9. The outcomes are plotted in Fig. 7. In all the stable steady states we have 
also determined the corresponding values of the cooperation parameters 
c1 = c2• These values are plotted in Fig. 8. In Fig. 9 we have plotted the payoffs 
for player 1 and 2 in the stable steady states which are greater than or equal to 
~- The dotted line in this figure is the payoff in the steady state 1. 
In all stationary feedback Nash equilibria that we find, convergence takes 
place to a quite cooperative situation; a threshold value of approximately 0.84 is 
found for the cooperation coefficients. However, there are two ways in which 
this cooperation is achieved. If the firms are already cooperative above the 
threshold value in a situation of equal distribution of profits (a = -5;), then 
a symmetric solution is obtained. This symmetry breaks down however if the 
firms are less cooperative at :x = 1; the slightest deviation of the initial value 
ix(O) = i will cause a process in which convergence takes place to a situation in 
which both firms are equally cooperative but take unequal shares in the 
revenues of cooperation. 
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Fig. 7. Bifurcation of steady states. 
Ste.acty State Cooperation 
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~ 
.,. 0.92 
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* 0.9 
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0.8'--'----'-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-'----' 0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.68 0 9 0.92 0 94 0.96 0 98 
c1(0 $);C2(0.5) 
Fig. 8. Steady-state cooperation. 
In a second experiment we have fixed the parameters at r = 1 and /3 = - !. 
This results in a decision rule in which the coordinator punishes deviation. In 
this case it is easily verified that the strategies c1 = c2 = I give a stationary 
feedback Nash equilibrium, with corresponding value functions V 1(:x) = 96:x 
and V 2(:x) = 96( 1 - :x). Moreover, we calculated solutions of the HJBI equations 
corresponding to several initial conditions c1 (!l = c 2 (~) E [O, I). In all these 
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Steady-state payott player 1 
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55 
~ 
50 
48,75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 
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Steady-state payoff player 2 
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2 
40 7 
3875 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 
c1 (0.5)=C2(0.5) 
Fig. 9. Steady-state payoffs. 
calculated solutions V 1 and V 2 turn out to be unbounded. This suggests that in 
this case the only symmetric stationary feedback Nash equilibrium is given by 
c1 = c1 = 1. Apparently the mechanism in which the coordinator punishes any 
deviation from a joint cooperative strategy (i.e. the mechanism with f3 < 0) is more 
effective, in the sense that it supports full cooperation (i.e. c1 = c2 = 1) as the only 
symmetric stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of the controlled game. 
5. A Pareto mechanism 
In this section we will consider a situation in which the coordination para-
meter rx. affects the underlying static game G not through the payoffs but rather 
through the strategy spaces of both players. We motivate the choice of coordina-
tion mechanism by the following result (see, e.g. Takayama 1985; Verkama 
1994). 
Theorem 13. For allµ E (0, 1) one has that if'(1'i. Y2) Er I x r 2 satisfies 
(fi,fz)Earg max {Jln1(Yi,Y 2) + (1 - Jl)nz(y 1,y2 )}, 
(y 1.y,)EI'1 X f' 2 
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then(;\, ;'2 ) is Pareto efficient. Moreover, u· r 1• r 2 are convex. and ni. rr 2 are 
conca1'e, then for all Pareto efficient pairs (;' 1• 1'2 ) there exists a p E [O, l] such 
that 
(f1,f2)Earg max {pn1()'i.}'2) + (l - p)n2(;• 1.;·2)}. 
D1•L!)EF1 x f'2 
We will no longer assume that G is symmetric. Also in this section we assume 
that the control objective is cooperation. The coordinator suggests which 
Pareto efficient strategy has to be chosen by the individual players, i.e. the 
coordinator determines the choice of p according to Theorem 13 at time instant 
t. The cooperative strategies to be considered are 1•f(x) = 1\(x). In this section we 
will exclude the possibility of sidepayments or redistribution, by taking 
(57) 
The HJBI equations describing the stationary feedback Nash equilibria of the 
controlled game are given by 
rV1(X) = max {V'1(x)f(X,Ci,C2) + 7r1(";'1(!l(), ;·i(:x))}, (58) 
c,E[O. l j 
rV2(°') = max { V2(0:).f(:x,c1,c2) + n2(J'1(0:), )'2(:x))}. (59) 
c,E(Q.1 j 
We find the following proposition: 
Proposition 14. Suppose G has a unique Nash equilibrium (·ji, 12 ). Further-
more, suppose the alternative strategy/'" is such that.for all CJ. E (0, 1) the system of' 
equations 
C1(1X)jif(o:) + (1 - C1(o:))yH!l(l = 1'1, 
C2(0:);•!(0:) + (l - C2(0:))}'2(:x) = 1z, 
has a unique solution (c1(o:),l'2(°')), with 0 :s; c;(o:) :s; 1. Then a stationaryfeedhack 
Nash equilibrium of the controlled game is given by 
(c1(o:), ci(:x)) = (i\(o:), c2(0:)). 
The actions ('I' 1(°'{t)),1• 2(o:(t))) played at ei1ery time instant t are equal to the Nash 
equilibrium (fi, y2 ) of G. 
Proof For all o:E(O,l) the Nash equilibrium of G 1s recovered for 
(ci,c 2) = (c1(o:),C2(o:)), more precisely 
c 1 (o:) E argmax ni(/' 1 ( o:), 1'2(e<)), 
c, 
c 2(o:) E argmax ni(I' 1 ( o:), ]!2(0:)). 
C1 
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Here Yi( a):= ci(a)}•*(a) + (1 - c;(cx))t(cx). Note 
ni(f 1(cx), fi(cx)) = nkyi, f 2) does not depend on a. 
given by 
that, for all a e (0, 1), 
The HJBI equations are 
r Vi(cx) = ni()\, 12), 
Vi(cx) = 0. 
Remark 15. Note that although the actions at every time instant t equal the 
actions corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium of G, they emerge from 
a different strategy. Moreover, these equilibrium strategies can give rise to 
a nontrivial dynamic behavior of a. So in this sense a coordination process does 
take place, but is never successful, because both players attain the same pa yo ff as 
in the case of noncooperative play. 
Remark 16. In general the conditions of Proposition 14 will not be satisfied for 
all a E (0, 1). In that case a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of the control-
led game will allow for different actions to be played. Also in the case of multiple 
Nash equilibria for the game G different actions can be expected. Furthermore it 
is important to note that, even in the case that all the conditions of Proposition 
14 are fulfilled, this Nash equilibrium is not necessarily unique. 
In the specific Cournot duopoly example we used in the previous section, it 
can straightforwardly be shown that the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium 
described by Proposition 14, in case the alternative strategies yt are chosen to be 
equal to the Nash strategies 1'h is in fact unique. This is a consequence of the fact 
that c1(1) = c2Hl = 0 provides the only consistent initial condition for the 
HJBl-DAEs. In this case the determinant of the matrix f (see Eq. (29)) is given 
by 
detf = - 33177616cx4 - 32cx3 + 3cx2 + 13a - 4 
(1 - 16cx + 16cx2) 2 ' (60) 
so that det f = 0 for a = - i + i-)17 ~ 0.390 or for a = ~ - ~.JU ~ 0.610, 
and moreover the denominator of det f equals 0 for a = 1 ± !)"3. Hence the 
system of HJBl-DAEs is locally of higher index. As a consequence the DASSL 
code cannot be used to obtain the solution. However, using the code RADAU5 
(see Hairer et al. 1989; Hairer and Wanner, 1991), which is also suited for 
semi-explicit index 2 and index 3 systems, it is possible to find the solution 
efficiently. 5 
5 Of course in this case we did not need to use any numerical method to find the solution. 
However, we can use this case as a testcase for the different numerical methods for DAEs. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have considered a class of models describing noncooperative 
hierarchical control. The most important aspect in this setup is that we have 
allowed for strategic behavior by the individual players, influencing the outcome 
of the coordination process. In the context of continuously repeated games we 
have obtained a nonlinear differential game, with state variable a, which we 
called the controlled game. 
We have taken a closer look at two special cases of such a controlled game, 
namely a redistribution controlled game and a Pareto controlled game. In both 
these special cases we looked at the control objective of establishing cooperation 
between the players in order to maximize efficiency. Using recently developed 
methods for differential-algebraic equations (DAEs), we have described in what 
way all stationary feedback Nash equilibria can be calculated for such differen-
tial games. In a worked example of a repeated symmetric Cournot duopoly, we 
have illustrated the numerical method for the redistribution controlled game. 
We saw that for this example there are several qualitatively different stationary 
feedback Nash equilibria. In this example we saw that if the players are 
sufficiently willing to cooperate at the point where all extra payoffs are divided 
equally between the players, this point is supported by the stationary feedback 
Nash equilibria as the only stable steady state. However, in case the players are 
not sufficiently willing to cooperate at this point, the stability of the steady state 
is lost. Moreover, we have seen that if the coordinator's decision rule is changed 
in such a way that relatively noncooperative attitudes are punished by the 
coordinator, a symmetric stationary feedback Nash equilibrium exists that 
supports full cooperation of both players. In the case of the Pareto controlled 
game, we found for the same example that the unique stationary feedback Nash 
equilibrium does not support any cooperation at all; in this case the coordina-
tion mechanism is too weak to stimulate cooperation. We can conclude that the 
choice of coordination mechanism and the choice of decision rule for the 
coordinator can be viewed as a control problem; by choosing the appropriate 
mechanism and decision rule a global control objective can be pursued. 
The models as introduced in this paper are capable of describing hierarchical 
situations where a coordinator is using a given (fixed) decision rule in order to 
reach some given control objective. In the context of continuously repeated 
games, we have shown how such a hierarchical situation can be translated into 
a differential game. For these games we have introduced a new method to 
calculate the stationary feedback Nash equilibria. The behavior of the corre-
sponding variables of interest will depend on the strategy chosen by the co-
ordinator, and in this way one obtains a method for policy evaluation. 
Obviously the model used in this paper is relatively simple and it would be 
natural to think of several extensions. In all examples we have looked at 
situations with only two players; the introduction of more than two players is 
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fairly straightforward as long as coalitions are not allowed. When coalitions 
may be formed, however, the analysis becomes much more difficult. The intro-
duction of more players might also lead to a state variable with more than one 
component; for instance this would be natural if the state is somehow inter-
preted as an indication of the position of the coordinator between the players. In 
this case the basic problem may still be posed as in the present paper but its 
numerical complexity would be much higher, since the HJBI equations lead in 
that case to partial differential equations rather than to ordinary differential 
equations. As a possible specialization of the models used in this paper, one may 
mention the case in which a zero-sum game is played on the lower decision level; 
this could be used for instance as a model for a Stackelberg game with 
a risk-sensitive follower. 
An important limitation of our models is that they are deterministic. In 
practice, a coordinator often tries to prevent strategic behavior by leaving some 
uncertainty about his responses to actions by the players. It would be of interest 
to investigate theoretically the effectivity of such a use of uncertainty. 
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